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Abstract
This paper examines whether myopia (misperception of the long-term care (LTC) risk)
and private insurance market loading costs can justify social LTC insurance and/or the
subsidization of private insurance. We use a two-period model wherein individuals di¤er
in three unobservable characteristics: level of productivity, survival probability and
degree of ignorance concerning the risk of LTC (the former two being perfectly positively
correlated). The decentralization of a rst-best allocation requires that LTC insurance
premiums of the myopic agents are subsidized (at a Pigouvianrate) and/or that there
is public provision of the appropriate level of LTC. The support for the considered LTC
policy instruments is less strong in a second-best setting. When social LTC provision
is restricted to zero, a myopic agents tax on private LTC insurance premiums involves
a tradeo¤ between paternalistic and redistributive (incentive) considerations and we
may have a tax as well as a subsidy on private LTC insurance. Interestingly, savings
(which goes untaxed in the rst-best but plays the role of self-insurance in the second-
best) is also subject to (positive or negative) taxation. Social LTC provision is never
second-best optimal when private insurance markets are fair (irrespective of the degree
of the proportion of myopic individuals and their degree of misperception). At the
other extreme, when the loading factor in the private sector is su¢ ciently high, private
coverage is completely crowded out by public provision. For intermediate levels of the
loading factors, the solution relies on both types of insurance.
Keywords: Long-term care, myopia, optimal taxation
JEL-Classication: D91, H21, I13
1 Introduction
The demand for professional long-term care (LTC) services is likely to increase dra-
matically during the decades to come. This is due to two main trends. The rst is
the forecasted aging of societies, and the increase in the proportion of individuals aged
80+, who represent the main group at risk for dependency. The second trend is related
to ongoing changes in society and family values, which imply that the current main
provider of LTC, namely the family, is likely to play a less signicant role in the future.
Consequently, dependency represents a major nancial risk in old age. The probability
that a 65-year-old will use a nursing home is quite signicant, with estimates ranging
from 35% to 49% (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009). Care provided in a nursing home may
be expensive, e.g., a single bedroom in a nursing home can cost up to $75,000 per year
(Genworth, 2010). One might expect that, faced with such a hazard, rational risk-averse
individuals would buy LTC insurance in order to smooth their consumption over the
di¤erent states of nature. However, in most countries only a small fraction of the pop-
ulation e¤ectively buys dependency insurance protection. The economic literature has
identied a number of factors that can explain the low level of LTC insurance demand.
These include signicant loading factors due to high administrative costs, adverse selec-
tion in the demand for insurance (Sloan and Norton, 1997; Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007 and 2009) and the existence of cheaper substitutes
like family care or public assistance (Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Strüwe, 1998; Brown and
Finkelstein, 2008). Last but not least, it is widely acknowledged that underestimation
or ignorance of the dependency risk is a major cause of the decient individual insurance
protection (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009; Pestieau and Ponthière, 2010; Zhou-Richter
et al., 2010). For many individuals, old-age dependency represents such a daunting
perspective that theyd rather not think about it, and least of all are ready to formally
acknowledge such a prospect by subscribing to insurance protection.
To elaborate on this point, given that objective probabilities of old-age dependency
are quite high, one can interpret the low demand for LTC insurance as revealing the
downward bias in the subjective probabilities of old-age dependency. Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) show, that the distribution of the subjective probability of entering a
nursing home within the next ve years of life has a singular form, and is not single-
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peaked. About 50 per cent of the population considers that the probability they enter
a nursing home in the next ve years is zero. The second peak of the distribution arises
at the value of 0.50: about 15 per cent of the population believes that the probability
to enter a nursing home equals 0.50. Very few people assign a probability larger than
0.50.
Because of these trends the provision of sustainable LTC protection represents a
looming challenge for the decades to come. If private markets remain insignicant and
family assistance decreases as expected, there appears to be a good case for government
intervention. This is even more so as LTC is not only a matter of e¢ ciency (and
insurance market failure) but also involves redistributive issues. Individuals who are
su¢ ciently wealthy can in any event nance LTC expenses from their savings so that
the lack of insurance is of limited relevance. However, a large fraction of the population
may not have enough savings or retirement income to face their dependency expenses
and in the absence of public intervention their failure to insure may have dramatic
implications.
The probably most widely debated instruments of public LTC policy are the sub-
sidization of private LTC insurance and the provision of social LTC insurance (with
either cash or in-kind benets). Their appropriate use has received little attention in
the literature so far, and the few papers there are do not appear to provide a lot of
support for either of these policies. Dependence is known to increase with longevity,
which in turn increases with income (Viscusi, 1994; Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2000).
This property has two important implications. First, private LTC insurance tends to
be a normal or even a luxury good which, from an optimal tax perspective, ought to
be taxed rather than subsidized; see e.g., Jousten et al., (2005); Pestieau and Sato,
(2006; 2008) and Cremer and Pestieau (2011). Second, with regard to the results of
Rochet (1991) this relationship between income and dependency sheds doubt on the
desirability of social LTC insurance. Rochet considers a setting in which individuals
di¤er in risk and productivity (both characteristics being unobservable), where the in-
come tax is optimized and where private insurance markets are actuarially fair. He
shows (roughly speaking) that full social insurance is appropriate if (and only if) risk
and earning ability are negatively correlated, a property which is commonly thought to
be satised for various health risks. However, in the case of LTC, we appear to have
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the opposite pattern of correlation and it follows that full social insurance is certainly
not optimal. The question of whether we need social insurance at all under positive
correlation is not explicitly addressed by Rochet, but the intuition underlying his other
results suggest that this is not likely to be the case.1
The important policy question is to know if these negative results are mere artifacts
of some restrictive assumptions or if they are su¢ ciently robust to provide a guideline
for policy design. One avenue to explore is to relax the assumption that the income tax
is optimal and not restricted (except by informational considerations). This approach
is taken by Cremer and Pestieau (2011), but they only provide a limited support to
an active LTC policy. In particular, they show that quite severe restrictions on the
income tax are needed to justify social LTC insurance. Specically, an optimal a¢ ne
tax function may be su¢ cient to make social insurance redundant. Furthermore, none
of these restrictions justies a subsidy on private insurance which remains subject to a
positive tax (linear or marginal nonlinear).
In this paper we explore an alternative path that one would intuitively expect to
provide a rationale for social LTC insurance. Our approach has two main features. First,
we assume that some individuals may be myopic in the sense that they underestimate
their dependency risk when they make their savings and insurance decisions. Second, to
introduce an extra measure of realism, we consider the possibility that private insurance
markets may not o¤er actuarially fair LTC coverage. In other words, private insurance
premiums may be subject to a loading factor. Except for these two variations, we remain
within the spirit of Rochet (1991) in the sense that we do not arbitrarily restrict the set
of available instruments (which is determined solely by the information structure).
We use a two-period model where individuals work in the rst period and survive
to the second period (old age) with some type-specic probability. Conditional on
survival all agents face the same probability of needing LTC. Individuals di¤er in three
unobservable characteristics: level of productivity, survival probability and degree of
ignorance concerning the risk of LTC. The former two are perfectly positively correlated.
In other words, a unique value of the survival probability is associated with every wage
level, and a higher wage also implies a higher survival probability. However, for each
pair of these two variables, there may be individuals with di¤erent degrees of myopia. In
1See also Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
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contrast to the government private insurance companies observe an individuals survival
probability implying that high-survival individuals have to pay a higher price for their
insurance coverage. Individuals who (partly) ignore their LTC risk make non-optimal
LTC insurance and savings decisions. In other words, they do not maximize their
trueexpected utility and ex post they will regret the decisions they made in the rst
period. Social welfare, on the other hand, is paternalisticin the sense that it depends
on individualstrue preferences. To decentralize a rst-best allocation, LTC insurance
premiums of the myopic agents can be subsidized (at a Pigouvianrate) or alternatively
we can have public provision of the appropriate level of LTC. Under full information
(and actuarially fair private insurance) these two instruments are perfectly equivalent,
but we need at least one of them. When private insurance is subject to a loading factor
(rst-best) social LTC provision dominates. Either way, these arguments show that we
can expect the two instruments to play a role in our setting but the question is if and
how they should be used in a second-best setting.
In accordance with our (second-best) information structure, we consider a nonlinear
tax scheme where the policy instruments include a tax on income, savings and private
LTC insurance premiums. Additionally, the government may publicly provide LTC. To
study this setting we proceed in two steps. First, we abstract from the possibility of
public LTC provision and give a characterization for the optimal marginal tax on private
LTC insurance premium and old-age savings. We show that for myopic agents, the
tax on private LTC insurance premiums is determined by Pigouvian and redistributive
elements, where the former calls for subsidization of LTC insurance expenditures, while
the latter may well call for a taxation of LTC. In other words, there is a tradeo¤between
paternalistic and redistributive (incentive) considerations and we may have a tax as well
as a subsidy on private LTC insurance. Interestingly, savings (which goes untaxed in the
rst-best) is also subject to (positive or negative) taxation in the second-best and the
expression for the tax rates includes also a Pigouvian and a redistributive term. Observe
that in a rst-best setting savings and LTC decisions are independent (individuals are
fully insured). In the second best this is no longer true; savings plays the role of self-
insurance and is treated accordingly by the tax policy.
In a second step, we determine whether it is optimal to use public LTC as an
additional instrument. Quite surprisingly, this is never optimal when private insurance
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markets are fair (irrespective of the degree of the proportion of myopic individuals
and their degree of misperception). This result is not due to a cost of public funds
argument but arises because private insurance has an informational advantage over
public coverage in our setting.2 At the other extreme, when the loading factor in the
private sector is su¢ ciently high, private coverage is completely crowded out by public
provision. For intermediate levels of the loading factors, the solution relies on both
types of insurance.
To sum up, while the full information solution to our model provides support for the
subsidization of LTC private insurance and/or for public provision (or insurance), these
results have to be qualied in a second-best setting. Surprisingly, myopia (irrespective of
its extent) is not per se su¢ cient to justify public LTC provision; a large private sector
loading factor on the other hand does plead for public provision (but this in turn is not
surprising). The tax treatment of private insurance is determined by a tradeo¤ between
paternalistic and redistributive considerations. Roughly speaking, misperceptions must
be su¢ ciently severe or widespread to obtain a subsidy. Myopia also a¤ects the tax
treatment of savings (which plays the role of self insurance) but here also the sign of
the overall tax is ambiguous.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and describes the laissez-
faire solution. Section 3 derives the rst-best solution. Section 4 analyzes the second-
best solution and studies the decentralization (implementation) of both rst- and second
best solutions. Section 5 studies the tax treatment of private insurance and savings
under the restriction that there is no public LTC provision, whereas Section 6 analyzes
whether it is optimal to provide public LTC. Numerical examples are presented in
Section 7. Section 8 summarizes our results.
2 The economy
2.1 The setup
Consider a two-period model in which all individuals are alive in the rst period during
which they work. Individuals of type i = 1; : : : ; N live with probability 'i during the
2Since we have an optimal income tax the cost of public funds is e¤ectively equal to one in the
second-best solution; see Jacobs (2010).
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second period, where 'i  'i+1. In this second period they are retired and possibly
disabled. Survival probability and earnings ability wi are perfectly positively correlated.
In other words, a single survival probability is associated with every wage level and both
variables (weakly) increase with i. Conditional on surviving in the second period, all
individuals face the same probability of becoming disabled, . Lifetime utility Ui is
assumed to be additive over time with a zero discount rate. Assuming that utility of
being death is zero, expected lifetime utility of individual-i is given by
Ui = u(ci)  v(`i) + 'i(1  )u(di) + 'iH(mi);
where ci denotes rst-period consumption while di and mi denote second-period con-
sumption in the case of being healthy and in the case of needing long-term care respect-
ively. Utilities u and H are such that u0;H 0 > 0 and u00;H 00 < 0. Labor supplied in
the rst-period is given by `i which one can think of as being the retirement age. Gross
earnings are thus given by yi = wi`i. Labor disutility v is increasing and strictly convex,
i.e., v0 > 0 and v00 > 0. In the second period individuals live of their savings and, in
case of disability, their private and public long-term care insurance coverage. Savings
si can be invested on a private annuity market at a zero interest rate and actuarially
fair prices implying a return equal to si='i. Long-term care insurance coverage can
be bought in the private market at a price 'i per unit of coverage, where   1
represents the private insurance loading factor. Individualsinsurance premiums i  0
depend on their probability of needing long-term care (namely 'i), that is, insurance
companies are able to observe each individuals type. With this assumption  = 1 yields
an actuarially fair private insurance. This is an interesting benchmark which enables
us to compare our results to those of Rochet (1991).
Not all individuals make their savings and long-term care insurance decisions accord-
ing to their true probability of being disabled while old. Some individuals underestimate
the risk of needing long-term by a share i 2 [0; 1]. These individuals reach their sav-
ings and long-term care insurance decisions on the basis of a perceived probability of
becoming disabled given by i. The parameter i can be interpreted as the individuals
degree of ignorance or myopia concerning the risk of disability. Formally, savings and
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Figure 1: Di¤erent types of individuals.
insurance decisions are made according to
Ui = u(ci)  v(`i) + 'i(1  i)u(di) + 'iiH(mi):
Agents with a very low i hardly realize that they may become dependent while old
and individuals with a i equal to one are perfectly aware of the risk. Any vector
(';w) may be associated with several levels of  and type i = 1; is dened by the
triplet ('i; wi; i). Total population size is normalized to one and the share of type-i
individuals is given by i. An example of such a setting is one with four types which
obtains when 'i 2 f'l; 'hg; wi 2 fwl; whg and i 2 fl; hg; it is depicted in Figure 1.
Type-1 and type-3 agents (partly) ignore the risk of needing long-term and either have
low or high ability/survival probability. Whereas type-2 and type-4 individuals have low
or high productivity/survival probability but are less myopic (have a higher i). This
four type specication will be used for the simulations in Section 7 and even simpler
two-type examples will be used to illustrate some results; see Subsections 5.15.3.
2.2 Laissez-faire
In the laissez-faire that is without government intervention individuals-i choose their
consumption levels ci; di;mi, savings si, labor supply `i and long-term care insurance
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expenses i by solving the following problem
max
ci;di;mi;si;`i;i
Ui = u(ci)  v(`i) + 'i(1  i)u(di) + 'iiH(mi);
s.t. ci = wi`i   si   i;
di =
si
'i
;
mi =
si
'i
+
i
'i
:
Substituting the expression for ci, di and mi into the utility function Ui, the rst-order
conditions with respect to `i, si and i are given by
wiu
0(ci) = v0(`i); (1)
u0(ci) = (1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi); (2)
u0(ci) =
i

H 0(mi): (3)
The rst equation simply states that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and labor is equal to wages. If the individual is perfectly aware of his true
probability of needing long-term care (i = 1) and there is no loading ( = 1), marginal
utilities across time and states of nature are equalized, u0(ci) = u0(di) = H 0(mi). Thus,
full insurance is optimal. If, however, the agent undervalues the probability of becoming
disabled in old age, he is less than perfectly insured against the risk of long-term care.
This is because from these individualsperspective, the premium of long-term care in-
surance is not actuarially fair even when  = 1. For i < 1 and  = 1 equations (2) and
(3) yield u0(di) < u0(ci) < H 0(mi). A high loading factor, , also reduces LTC insurance
coverage. When  > 1, the return of private savings is higher than the LTC insurance
coverage in case of dependency, that is, private LTC insurance is dominated by savings
and we have i = 0. In other words, the individual self-insures through savings rather
than buying insurance coverage on the market.
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3 First-best solution
Throughout the paper we take a paternalistic approach and consider the utilitarian
optimum based on individualstrue probability of needing long-term care and not on
the one perceived by myopic individuals. Ex post individuals are grateful to the social
planner to have forced them to behave according to their true LTC risk. In the rst-best
setting, the social planner observes the individuals types, namely their productivity,
survival probabilities and their degree of myopia. Welfare maximization is subject to
the resource constraint that aggregate consumption cannot exceed aggregate production.
The corresponding Lagrangian denoted by LFB is
LFB(ci; `i; di;mi) =
X
i
i

u(ci)  v

yi
wi

+ 'i(1  )u(di) + 'iH(mi)

+ 
X
i
i

yi   ci   'i(1  )di   'imi
	
; (4)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint. The FOCs for type-i
can be written as
wiu
0(ci) = v0(`i) and u0(ci) = u0(di) = H 0(mi) =  8 i: (5)
This implies for labor supply and consumption
`i = `j if wi = wj and `i < `j if wi < wj 8i; j
ci = di = const. 8i; mi = const. 8i:
Individuals with high-productivity should supply more labor (irrespective of their ).
Consumption levels of the young and healthy elderly are equalized across types. In
addition, the LTC expenditures mi are the same for all types. The comparison between
ci = di and mi depends on the functional form of u and H (but marginal utilities are
equalized). Given a utilitarian welfare function, resources are transferred not only from
high- to low-productivity individuals, but also from the short- to the long-lived ones.
As there is a positive correlation between wages and survival probability, the overall
direction of redistribution is thus ambiguous. We assume throughout the paper that
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the redistribution goes from high- to low-wage individuals. In other words, we assume
that earning abilities represent the dominating source of heterogeneity.3 In Section 4.1
we show how the rst-best solution can be decentralized.
4 Second-best problem
We now turn our attention to the second-best solution where individualstypes, that
is, wi, 'i and i are not publicly observable. The distribution of types is common
knowledge and this includes the information that productivities and survival probabilit-
ies are perfectly positively correlated. Additionally income yi savings si and long-term
care insurance premiums i are observable. Consequently, an individuals rst period
consumption level is e¤ectively observable. In the following subsection, we study how
the second-best solution can be implemented with the instruments available given this
information structure.
4.1 Implementation
Under the considered information structure instruments include a (possibly nonlinear)
transfer scheme T (yi; si; i) and a payment to the dependent individuals Di  0.4 In
other words, income, savings and long-term care insurance premiums can be taxed or
subsidized and T (yi; si; i) also includes an individualized lump-sum transfer Ti which
can be positive or negative. In addition, public long-term care Di can be provided in
case of disability.
With such a transfer function the individuals problem is given by
max
yi;si;i
Ui =u(yi   si   i   T (yi; si; i))  v

yi
wi

+ 'i(1  i)u

si
'i

+ 'iiH

si
'i
+
i
'i
+Di

: (6)
3 Instead we could introduce weights in the social welfare function to insure this outcome. The
underlying idea is that redistribution from short- to long-lived (and otherwise identical) individual does
not appear to be acceptable; see Pestieau and Ponthière (2012).
4To maintain the symmetry with private insurance we assume throughout the paper that Di is
nonnegative. In other words we rule out a (positive) tax specically targeted at dependent individuals.
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This yields the following rst-order conditions
@Ui
@yi
= u0(ci)(1  Ty(yi; si; i))  v0(`i) 1
wi
 0; (7)
@Ui
@si
=  u0(ci)(1 + Ts(yi; si; i)) + (1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi) = 0; (8)
@Ui
@i
=  u0(ci)(1 + T(yi; si; i)) + i

H 0(mi)  0: (9)
Note that for a high degree of ignorance concerning the need for long-term care (a low
level of i), a high loading, or a high tax on private LTC insurance, the individual may
not buy any long-term care insurance coverage at all, that is i = 0. Assuming an
interior solution for yi and i, the above FOCs can be rewritten as
v0(`i)
u0(ci)
= wi(1  Ty(yi; si; i)) (10)
(1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi)
u0(ci)
= 1 + Ts(yi; si; i) (11)
H 0(mi)
u0(ci)
=

i
(1 + T(yi; si; i)): (12)
When T iy; T
i
s ; T
i
 < (>)0, type-i faces a marginal subsidy (tax) on income, savings and
private long-term care insurance respectively. As `i can be considered as the retirement
age of a type-i individual, T iy can be also interpreted as an implicit subsidy (tax) on
prolonged activity. In our context, savings also act as a self-insurance device. An
implicit subsidy (tax) on savings thus increases (reduces) the attractiveness to self-
insure against the risk of needing LTC. The same applies for private long-term care
insurance. The agent is less than fully insured against the risk of needing LTC whenever
the marginal utility in the state of disability is above the marginal utility in the healthy
state, i.e., H 0(m) > u0(d). Combining equations (11) and (12) yields
H 0(mi)
u0(di)
=
1  i
i

1+T is
1+T i
  i
 1 if i

1 + T is
1 + T i
 1:
That is apart from myopia and a positive loading both the tax on LTC insurance
and the tax on savings determine whether the individual is fully insured or not.
Before proceeding with the characterization of the second best, it is useful to dis-
cuss the decentralization of the rst-best solution. To achieve this, we need apart
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from individualized lump-sum transfers corrective subsidies on long-term care insur-
ance premiums. The required tax rate can be derived by comparing the FOCs of the
rst-best solution (5) with equations (10) to (12). This yields the following result
FB : 1 + T iy = 1; 1 + T
i
s = 1; 1 + T
iP
 = i: (13)
The rst-best optimum can be reached with a zero tax on labor and savings, that is,
myopia regarding LTC does not distort savings. However, it is optimal to subsidize
agents who undervalue their probability of needing long-term care, i < 1. Specically,
the Pigouvian subsidy,  T iP = 1  i, is chosen to exactly o¤set individuals myopia.
Once, we have corrected for myopia with respect to the probability of needing long-term
care, we no longer need any subsidies on savings as agents, then, will choose the optimal
savings plan by themselves.5 If there is a positive loading on the private LTC insurance
market,  > 1, the rst-best solution can be achieved by providing solely public long-
term care. Observe that in a rst best setting and when  = 1, private insurance and
public provision are two equivalent ways of implementing the optimum. When  > 1,
this is no longer true and private insurance is dominated by public provision.6
4.2 General solution
With the considered information structure feasible allocations must satisfy the following
incentive constraints
u(ci)  v

yi
wi

+ 'i(1  i)u

si
'i

+ 'iiH

si
'i
+
i
'i
+Di


u(cj)  v

yj
wi

+ 'i(1  i)u

sj
'i

+ 'iiH

sj
'i
+
j
'i
+Dj

8 i 6= j: (14)
That is any type-i must be prevented from mimicking any type-j individual. In addition
the resource constraint continues of course to apply. The Lagrangian LSB(ci; yi; si; i; Di)
5As an alternative to subsidizing private long-term insurance, it could be made compulsory (at the
rst-best level). This is a feasible way to decentralize the optimum even when i = 0 (in which case
marginal subsidization is ine¤ective).
6This is admittedly articial, though, because one can argue that in a rst-best setting we have
 = 1.
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of the second-best problem is then given by
LSB =
X
i
i

u(ci)  v

yi
wi

+ 'i(1  )u

si
'i

+ 'iH

si
'i
+
i
'i
+Di

+
X
i6=j
ij

u(ci)  v

yi
wi

+ 'i(1  i)u

si
'i

+ 'iiH

si
'i
+
i
'i
+Di

+
X
i6=j
ij

 u(cj) + v

yj
wi

  'i(1  i)u

sj
'i

  'iiH

sj
'i
+
j
'i
+Dj

+ 
X
i
i

yi   ci   si   i   'iDi
	
; (15)
where  > 0 is the multiplier of the resource constraint while ij  0 is the multi-
plier associated with the self-selection constraint from type-i to type-j. The rst-order
conditions are given by
@LSB
@ci
=
8<:i + X
j:i6=j
ij  
X
j:i6=j
ji
9=;u0(ci)  i = 0 (16)
@LSB
@yi
= 
8<:i + X
j:i6=j
ij
9=; v0 (`i) 1wi + X
j:i6=j
jiv
0 (`ji)
1
wj
+ i  0 (17)
@LSB
@si
=
8<:i(1  ) + X
j:i6=j
ij(1  i)
9=;u0(di) +
8<:i + X
j:i6=j
iji
9=;H 0(mi)
 
X
j:i6=j
ji

(1  j)u0(dji) + jH 0(mji)
	  i = 0 (18)
@LSB
@i
=
1

8<:i + X
j:i6=j
iji
9=;H 0(mi)  1 X
j:i6=j
jijH
0(mji)  i  0; (19)
@LSB
@Di
='i
8<:i + X
j:i6=j
iji
9=;H 0(mi)  X
j:i6=j
jij'jH
0(mji)  i'i  0; (20)
An interior solution for ci requires
i +
X
j:i6=j
ij  
X
j:i6=j
ji > 0:
First, we consider a setting without public provision of long-term care, i.e., we impose
Di = 0 8 i as extra constraint. The remaining questions from our perspective then
concern the tax treatment of private LTC insurance and of savings (which has a role of
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self-insurance). In a second step, we study the optimal level of public LTC. In particular,
we examine under what conditions it is optimal for the government to provide public
long-term care.
5 Second-best solution without public LTC provision
To simplify notation, dene
W is  (1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi) and W jis  (1  j)u0(dji) + jH 0(mji): (21)
Combining and rearranging the rst-order conditions equations (16) to (19) yields the
following marginal rates of substitution for a type-i individual
v0(`i)
u0(ci)
= wi
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
v0(`ji)wi
v0(`i)wj
(22)
(1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi)
u0(ci)
=
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
i
1
1+T iPs
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
W jis
W is
(23)
H 0(mi)
u0(ci)
=

i
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
i
1
1+T iP
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
jH0(mji)
iH0(mi)
; (24)
where the Pigouvian tax on LTC insurance premiums is dened by (13) as T iP =
i   1  0. This is the level of subsidy required to correct for individualsmyopia. We
have seen in the previous section that in the rst-best, no tax on savings is required.
Once private LTC insurance was at the appropriate level, the saving decision would
spontaneously by optimal (even for myopic individuals). This is no longer true in the
second-best and we can redene the Pigouvian taxon savings as that which corrects
for myopia and is determined by
1 + T iPs =
(1  i)u0(di) + iH 0(mi)
(1  )u0(di) + H 0(mi) : (25)
Observe when u0(di) = H 0(mi) (i.e., there is full insurance) we have T iPs = 0 which is
consistent with our rst-best result. However when there is underinsurance (u0(di) <
H 0(mi)), we have T iPs < 0 and self-insurance is subsidized to compensate for the e¤ect of
myopia. Conversely when there is overinsurance a tax on savings is required (T iPs > 0)
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to correct for myopia.7
When individuals make their consumption, labor and LTC insurance decisions, they
equalize these marginal rates with their perceived (tax included) relative prices; see
equations (10)(12). Combining these expressions with equations (22)(24) then allows
us to study the implementing policy. The interesting marginal tax (or subsidy) rates
from our perspective are the ones on savings and on private LTC insurance.
First, consider the marginal tax or subsidy on private LTC insurance. Combining
equations (12) and (24) yields
1
1 + T i
=
i
1
1+T iP
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
jH
0(mji)
iH0(mi)
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
: (26)
Observe that in the full information solution, i.e. when ij = ji = 0 8i; j, expression
(26) yields a Pigouvian subsidy which is positive (and equal to 1 i) for all individuals
who undervalue their risk of dependency in old age (see eq. (13)). However, when at
least one self-selection constraint is binding, the optimal solution is no longer rst-best.
Consider the top individual, that is, a person whom nobody mimics implying
ji = 0 8 j, but ij > 0 for at least one j. For such a person (26) can be rewritten as
1 + T i =
1 +
P
j:i6=j ij
i
1
1+T iP
+
P
j:i6=j ij
i
(27)
If this person is rational and correctly perceives his probability of dependency (so that
T iP = 0) he faces no distortion because we have T
i
 = 0. If, however, this person
undervalues the risk of LTC (so that T iP < 0), equation (27) implies (1+T
i
) > (1+T
iP
 )
so that the subsidy on LTC is lower than the Pigouvian level. That is for myopic top
individuals the famous no distortion at the topresult no longer holds.8 An observation
which is in line with Cremer et al. (1998; 2009) who have pointed out that rst- and
second-best levels of Pigouvian taxes typically di¤er. This is because the Pigouvian rule
7The numerical examples presented in Section 7 show that both cases are possible in the second-best.
8Using equation (27) it follows that (1 + T i) > (1 + T
iP
 ) is equivalent to
1 +
P
j:i6=j ij
i
1
1+T iP

+
P
j:i6=j ij
i
> (1 + T iP ):
Cross multiplying and rearranging this expression shows that the inequality is implied by (1+T iP ) < 1:
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implicitly uses the marginal utility of income to determine the monetary(numeraire)
equivalent of a utility variation.
Let us now turn to the general case, where individual-i is not (necessarily) the top in-
dividual. Intuitively, one would expect that 1+T i < 1 implying a subsidy on long-term
care expenses at the margin for all those individuals who undervalue their probabil-
ity of becoming dependent when old. However, in the second-best a tax/subsidy on
long-term care premiums also has incentive e¤ects. This is shown by the numerator of
the LHS of equation (26) where one can think about the rst term as the Pigouvian
(paternalistic) element, while the other terms capture the incentive e¤ects. These in-
centive e¤ects arise because taxing or subsidizing LTC insurance is not neutral from a
redistributive perspective. Observe that while labor supply is separable from the other
goods, the Atkinson and Stiglitz result does not hold here because individuals di¤er
in more than one dimensions. This is already true when there is no myopia (or when
all individuals are equally myopic) because survival probabilities di¤er along with pro-
ductivities. Di¤erences in the degree of myopia introduces yet another dimension of
heterogeneity. To get a more precise understanding of the structure of this incentive
term and its interaction with the Pigouvian term, we can rearrange equation (26) to
obtain the following condition
1 + T i T 1 ()
(1  i)
i
S
X
j:i6=j
ji
i

j
i
H 0(mji)
H 0(mi)
  1

: (28)
The LHS of the second expression is equal to the Pigouvian subsidy (expressed as a
tax rate),  T iP =(1 + T iP )  0. The RHS (of the second inequality) constrains a sum
over all types j, but the corresponding term is nonzero only when ji > 0, that is when
the incentive constraint from type-j to type-i is binding. Further, the rst term in
brackets (jH 0(mji)=iH 0(mi)) represents the ratio of the mimickers and the mimicked
individuals marginal rate of substitution between consumption ci and LTC expensesmi;
recall that ci is e¤ectively observable so that cji = ci. When this term is larger than 1, a
tax (downward distortion) on mi relaxes a binding incentive constraint. Consequently,
when the sum of the terms on the RHS is positive, the incentive term supports a tax
on mi and thus opposes the Pigouvian term. The sign of T i then depends on which of
these two terms is the most signicant. On the other hand, when the incentive term is
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negative, both e¤ects go in the same direction and we necessarily have a subsidy on mi.
When all agents have the same degree of myopia (j = i) we have
H 0(mji)
H 0(mi)
T 1 if 'j T 'i since mji S mi if 'j T 'i: (29)
Thus, if incentive constraints are binding from higher wage to lower wage individuals,
this expression is larger than one calling for taxation rather than subsidization of long-
term care insurance premiums. Intuitively this makes sense: compared to the lower
wage individuals, individuals with a higher wage put a larger weight on LTC expenses
because their survival probability is larger. When the degree of myopia di¤ers between
individuals this e¤ect is strengthened when the able tend to be less myopic; otherwise,
it is weakened (and may be even reversed).
This discussion is quite general and remains e¤ectively valid for any (nite) number
of types. However, it also shows that to predict the sign of the tax/subsidy on LTC
insurance one has to make assumption on the pattern of binding incentive constraints
which, at this level of generality, is admittedly rather speculative. The assumptions can
be better understood when we restrict ourselves to specic distributions of types; see
Subsections 5.15.3. However, the only way to obtain a precise determination of the
pattern of binding incentive constraints is to use simulations. This is what well do in
Section 7.
Before turning to these more specic settings let us consider the marginal tax (sub-
sidy) on savings, or self-insurance. Combining equations (11) and (23) and rearranging
yields
1
1 + T is
=
i
1
1+T iPs
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
W jis
W is
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
; (30)
where T iPs is dened by (25) while W
i
s and W
ji
s are determined by (21). The structure
of this equation very much resembles that of (26). In particular we have Pigouvian and
incentive e¤ects which matter. The study of the di¤erent terms is, however, considerably
more complicated.
As for LTC insurance the no distortion at the top result holds for rational but not
for myopic topindividuals. Specically, if ji = 0 8 j, but ij > 0 for at least one j
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equation (30) can be rewritten as
1 + T is =
1 +
P
j:i6=j ij
i
1
1+T iPs
+
P
j:i6=j ij
i
; (31)
which is the counterpart to (27) for i. If this person is fully insured (so that T iPs = 0)
he faces no distortion because we have T is = 0. However, as soon as T
iP
s 6= 0 we will
have T is 6= T iPs . The di¢ culty is that unlike for , we do not know the sign of the
Pigouvian tax on si. If the person is less than fully insured against the risk of LTC (so
that T iPs < 0), equation (31) implies (1 + T
i
s) > (1 + T
iP
s ) so that again the subsidy on
LTC is lower than the Pigouvian level. When T iPs > 0;we have the opposite result.
For the other types, we can proceed as above and rearrange (30) to obtain the
counterpart to (28)
1 + T is T 1 ()
 T iPs
1 + T iPs
S
X
j:i6=j
ji
i
 
W jis
W is
  1
!
: (32)
Once again, the LHS of the second part is the Pigouvian subsidy (rate) while the RHS is
the incentive term, where W jis =W is is the ratio of the mimickers and the mimicked indi-
viduals marginal rate of substitution between consumption and saving. The expression
is more complicated than that for i because si plays a double role, as consumption in
the good state of nature and as self-insurance in case of dependency. When incentive
constraints bind from the able to the less able, and when there is no heterogeneity in
myopia, we can show that the incentive term is positive. To see this, note that
dji S di () 'j T 'i ) u
0(dji)
u0(di)
T 1 () 'j T 'i:
With the denition in (21) and (29), we then have
W jis
W is
T 1 if 'j T 'i and j = i: (33)
For the rest, not much can be said at this level of generality. With both the Pigouvian
and the incentive term of ambiguous sign, both positive and negative tax rates on savings
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Figure 2: 2-Type economies.
are possible (and this is conrmed by the numerical example below).9
To gain more insight in the interplay of the Pigouvian tax/subsidy and the re-
distributive considerations, we study three di¤erent 2-type economies in the following
subsections. The di¤erent congurations are depicted in Figure 2.
5.1 No myopic agents-(I)
As a benchmark scenario, consider a society where all agents correctly perceive their
dependency probability, i.e., h = 1. In other words, there are type-2 and 4 agents (case
I in Figure 2). Assume that only the downward self-selection constraint is binding, that
is, we want to redistribute to the low ability individuals. Then, type-4 individuals
are the top agents implying type-2 individuals have no incentive to mimic type-4
individuals and 24 = 0. In this case, the no distortion at the top condition applies for
type-4 individuals: (1 + T 4s ) = 1 and (1 + T
4
 ) = 1. For type-2 individuals, we have
1 + T 2 =
2   42
2   42H0(m42)H0(m2)
> 1 and 1 + T 2s =
2   42
2   42W 42sW 2s
> 1:
To establish the above results we use '4 > '2 which implies H 0(m42)=H 0(m2) > 1 and
W 42s =W
2
s > 1 (see eqs. (29) and (33)). Consequently, low ability individuals face a
9When type-i is fully insured against the LTC risk so that u0(di) = H 0(mi) we have 1 + T iPs = 1. If
we further assume that incentive constraints are binding according to decreasing ability, it follows from
(21) that W jis =W
i
s > 1 (for any j and i) which in turn implies 1 + T
i
s > 1. In words, a fully insured
individual faces a tax on savings. For such an individual saving has no self-insurance role and the tax
on savings arises for redistributive reasons.
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positive marginal tax on both LTC insurance and savings (self-insurance). This does
not come as a surprise: individuals of type-4 have a higher survival probability and thus
put a higher weight on LTC and savings than type-2 individuals. We then obtain the
traditional result that the downward distortion on the low type relaxes an otherwise
binding self-selection constraint. And since individuals are rational, no paternalistic
considerations come in.
5.2 Perfect correlation between productivity and rationality-(II)
Assume now that productivity and rationality are perfectly positively correlated. In
other words, the more able individuals are also the rational ones, while all the less able
are myopic (there are only type-1 and 4 individuals). Continue to assume that only the
downward incentive constraint is binding so that 14 = 0, which implies (1 + T 4s ) = 1
and (1 + T 4 ) = 1 (zero marginal taxes for type 4 individuals). For type-1 individuals,
conditions (30) and (26) can be rearranged to yield
1 + T 1 = (1 + T
1P
 )
1   41
1   41H0(m41)H0(m1)| {z }
>1
T 1 and 1 + T 1s =
1   41
1
1
1+T 1Ps
  41W 41W 1s
T 1:
The tax on LTC insurance shows that the paternalistic and incentive e¤ects now go
in opposite directions. Consequently, for individual 1 the marginal tax on LTC insur-
ance is larger than the Pigouvian tax (which, we know to be negative and equal to
(1   1)). This means either that the subsidy is reduced for redistributive purposes or
even that we switch to a positive tax. Whether a positive tax arises depends on the
relative strength of the paternalistic and the redistributive terms. Results concerning
the optimal tax/subsidy on savings are not clear-cut.
5.3 All individuals are myopic-(III)
Finally, assume that all individuals underestimate their dependence probability. There
are only type-1 and type-3 individuals who di¤er solely in productivity and survival
probability. Continue to assume that the incentive constraints are binding according to
wage di¤erentials, i.e.; 31 > 0: For expressions (30) and (26), we then have for type-1
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and 3 individuals respectively
1 + T 1 = (1 + T
1P
 )
1   31
1   311H0(m31)H0(m1)
T 1 and 1 + T 1s =
1   31
1
1
1+T 1Ps
  31W 31sW 1s
T 1
1 + T 3 = (1 + T
P3
 )
3 + 31
3 + 331| {z }
>1
< 1 and 1 + T 3s =
3 + 31
3
1
1+T 3Ps
+ 31
T 1:
The no distortion at the top result no longer holds. As the top agents are ignorant
concerning their LTC needs in old age, the government subsidizes their LTC insurance.
This subsidy less than o¤sets their degree of myopia. Concerning type-1 individuals,
results are not clear-cut as both the incentive and Pigouvian terms are at work.
6 Second-best solution with public LTC provision
So far we have restricted Di to be zero thus ruling out direct provision of LTC services
or a system of public LTC insurance (nanced by taxation and paying benets in case
of dependency). This assumption has no directimpact on the results concerning the
tax treatment of  and s. To be more precise, all the results obtained in Section 5
remain valid when Di is introduced, as long as the solution for i remains interior.10
Now, assuming an interior solution for i appears to be quite natural when the public
alternative is ruled out.11 However, when both i and Di are available the existence of
an interior solution for all variables is less obvious. As a matter of fact, the rst issue
that has to be dealt with is whether there is a role for both instruments and, if not,
which of the two instruments ought to be used. This is the question to which we now
turn.
Combining (19) and (20) shows that to have an interior solution for both i and Di,
the following expression must be zero

@LSB
@i
  1
'i
@LSB
@Di
=
X
j:i6=j
jij

'j
'i
  1

H 0(mji)  i(   1) = 0: (34)
The rst term in this equation measures the incentive benets of i, while the second
10Since individuals work only in the rst period the solution for si is necessarily interior (under some
weak regularity condition on preferences).
11Unless of course  is very large in which case individuals may rely solely on self-insurance.
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term represents the cost associated with private insurance (converted into utility terms).
Consider rst the case of an actuarially fair private LTC insurance market,  = 1.
One could then be tempted to think that the two instruments would be equivalent (or
redundant). Private insurance has no loading cost and since the income tax is optim-
ized the nancing of public insurance does not imply any deadweight loss.12 However,
this conjecture does not stand under closer scrutiny. To see this, assume for the time
being that at least one incentive constraint toward type-i is binding, i.e. ji > 0 for
some j. With the assumed pattern of binding incentive constraints (from higher pro-
ductivities to lower productivities and thus from high to low survival probabilities) the
mimicker (type-j) has a higher survival probability than the mimicked (type-i), 'i < 'j ,
and from equation (34) follows immediately Di = 0. In other words, no public LTC
benets should be provided to the mimicked individual. Roughly speaking the fair
private insurance does not redistribute at all while the social insurance redistributes
in the wrongdirection. This reverse redistribution arises because of the information
structure combined with the (positive) correlation between ability and LTC risk. The
two instruments e¤ectively have di¤erent impacts on the incentive constraints. When
private insurance markets are actuarially fair, we implicitly assume that private insur-
ance companies observe an individuals survival probability (and longer lived individuals
pay higher premiums). Public authorities, on the other hand, do not observe this sur-
vival probability and Di can be conditioned on the type only through self-selection.
Consequently, the mimicker would be better o¤ by just taking Di (in which case he is
treated exactly like type-i) than by taking i, as he has to pay a higher price for private
LTC insurance coverage. Public provision of LTC would thus only increase incentives
for high survival probability types to mimic low survival probability types. In other
words it would reinforce (rather than relax) a binding incentive constraint. Interest-
ingly, the fact that some individuals may underestimate their dependence probability
has absolutely no bearing on this result.
The argument presented so far applies for Di as long as there is at least one ji > 0.
If not, we are dealing with the top individual for which we obtain that private and
public LTC are perfect substitutes (as long as private insurance is actuarially fair). In
other words, public LTC provision to high types crowds out one-for-one their private
12See Jacobs (2010).
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LTC insurance coverage and yields no additional welfare gains. To sum up, we can state
that with an actuarially fair private LTC insurance market (and an optimal income
tax) social LTC insurance is not desirable. This result is not surprising as it is the
counterpart to Rochets (1991) and conrms the conjecture made in the introduction.13
What is more surprising, though, is the fact that the presence of myopia does not a¤ect
this result; see equation (34). Myopia comes in only through the Pigouvian term in the
tax/subsidy on i. In other words myopia is taken care of by the marginal tax on i, but
it does not justify social insurance. Even if agents are completely ignorant concerning
their future LTC needs, i.e. i = 0, this result remains una¤ected. In this case, we need
a mandatory private insurance (rather than just a subsidy), but this is only a matter of
implementation.
So far, we have assumed that the private LTC insurance market o¤ers fair contracts.
When private insurance implies loading costs, the results do of course change and in a
rather intuitive way. Expression (34) shows that when  is su¢ ciently large, the results
can be completely reversed and we obtain a corner solution with i = 0 and Di > 0.
Finally, for intermediate level of  we can have an interior solution with both private
and public insurance (i > 0 and Di > 0) which strikes a compromise between the costs
and benets implied by each system (loading factor vs. incentive e¤ect). To be precise,
at this level of generality we can only say that intermediate levels of  are compatible
with an interior solution. The numerical examples presented in the next section show
that such an interior solution can e¤ectively arise.
Before turning to these simulations let us briey examine the rule for the determ-
ination of Di in those cases where the solution is interior, that is Di > 0 and i = 0.
Combining the rst order conditions (16) and (20) yields the following marginal rate of
substitution for a type-i individual
H 0(mi)
u0(ci)
=
1
i
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
i
1
1+T iPD
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ij
j
i
'j
'i
H0(mji)
H0(mi)
; (35)
where T iPD = T
iP
 = i   1 is the Pigouvian tax. We can think of this marginal rate
13Rochet (1991) has two parts. In the rst part taxes and social insurance are linear and he shows
that when the covariance between risk and ability is positive, social insurance is not desirable. However,
the part which is closest to our analysis is the second one in which all instruments can be nonlinear.
There he focuses on conditions which yield full insurance and does specically look at the desirability
of social insurance.
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of substitution as dening an implicit marginal tax on Di, which represents the wedge
between the rst- and second best tradeo¤. We dene this implicit tax T iD as the
marginal tax that decentralizes the second best level of Di if public LTC insurance is
otherwise sold at a fair price. Formally, this is given by (12) with  = 1. Combining
this expression with (35) yields
1
1 + T iD
=
i
1
1+T iPD
+
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ij
j
i
'j
'i
H0(mji)
H0(mi)
i +
P
j:i6=j ij  
P
j:i6=j ji
Compared to equation (26), the incentive term now includes the ratio 'j='i which calls
for a higher tax rate if incentive constraints are binding from high to low wage types.
This is in line with our discussion above: with only public provision of LTC it becomes
less costly to mimic other agents and thus the incentives to do so increase. Consequently,
with public provision it is more likely than with private insurance that the incentive
e¤ect outweighs the Pigouvian e¤ect so that we end up with a positive tax on LTC.
And even when the Pigouvian term dominates, the subsidy will be smaller than with
private insurance.14
7 Numerical examples
The results presented so far are fairly general but most of the discussions rely on as-
sumptions on the pattern of binding incentive constraints. We now turn to numerical
simulations for which we can e¤ectively determine which incentive constraints are bind-
ing. These results are admittedly all for a very specic setting which we cannot claim to
be tted exactly to reality. Still they are useful in several respects. First, they show that
the assumptions we make in the general setting are not empty.15 Second, they show
that the expressions that appeared to be ambiguous in the general model, can e¤ectively
produce positive and negative results. Third, they show that the various interior and
corner solutions alluded to in Section 6 can e¤ectively arise.
In addition, we use the numerical model to study some comparative statics proper-
ties. Specically, we consider variations in the degree of myopia, in the loading factor,
and in the proportion of myopic individuals. Due to the restrictive character of the set-
14For a given pattern of binding incentive constraints.
15 In other words, we do not make assumptions which are inconsistent and can never be satised.
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ting our ndings have to be qualied accordingly and to be seen merely as an illustration.
Simulations are based on the 4-type setting depicted in Figure 1. The proportion of
individuals with h in wage category wk (k = l; h) is denoted k. Throughout this
section, we assume l = h = . With h = 1 this corresponds to the proportion of
rational individuals. Utilities and labor disutility are given by
u(xij) =  e xij H(mij) =  e mij L and v(`ij) =
`2ij
2
:
The disutility of LTC is thus given by a monetary loss of amount L. The basic parameter
values are given in Table 1. With these values, we expect that the di¤erence in pro-
Table 1: Basic parameters
wl = 2 wh = 5
'l = 0:8 'h = 1
h = 1 0:6l 0:4h
l = 0:2 0:6(1  l) 0:4(1  h)
ductivity dominates that in survival probabilities so that the utilitarian solution implies
redistribution to type-l individuals (and this conjecture is conrmed by our results).
Additionally, we assume  = 0:4, L = 3 and  = 1 for our benchmark scenario.16
Table 2 shows the laissez-faire solution. As we already know from Section 2.2 even
though private LTC care insurance is actuarially fair, myopic agents are not fully in-
sured. In other words, their LTC insurance coverage i=('j) is smaller than the loss
L. Rational agents, by contrast are fully insured implying i=('j) = L. In the rst-
best solution consumption levels across types and time are equalized, i.e., ci = di =
mi = 1:28 8 i. Income for type-l individuals is given by y1 = y2 = 1:12 and for type-h
individuals by y3 = y4 = 6:97.
7.1 No public LTC provision
For the time being we set Di = 0. The second-best solution for the benchmark scenario
is reported in Table 3. There turns out to be pooling of individuals with wl; they have
the same consumption allocation across time and states irrespective of their level of
16Brown and Finkelstein (2009) show for the U.S. that the probability of needing long-term care for
a 65 year old is between 35 and 50 per cent.
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Table 2: Laissez-faire solution
Type ci yi si di i mi
1 0.72 1.95 0.92 1.15 0.31 -0.89
2 0.64 2.11 0.51 0.64 0.96 0.64
3 1.75 4.30 2.18 2.18 0.39 0.14
4 1.70 4.59 1.70 1.70 1.2 1.70
Table 3: No public LTC provision: l = h = 0:5
type ci yi si di i mi T i T
i
s
benchmark 1 0.87 1.32 0.49 0.61 1.09 1.01 -0.83 0.26
2 0.87 1.32 0.49 0.61 1.09 1.01 -0.13 0.12
3 1.47 5.73 1.71 1.71 0.90 0.96 -0.67 -0.14
4 1.45 5.84 1.45 1.45 1.20 1.45 0 0
binding ICs 12, 21, 31, 32, 41,42, 43
l = 0:6 1 0.87 1.32 0.57 0.71 0.98 0.78 -0.34 0.16
2 0.87 1.32 0.57 0.71 0.98 0.78 0.10 0.14
3 1.47 5.77 1.60 1.60 1.05 1.23 -0.24 -0.03
4 1.45 5.79 1.45 1.45 1.20 1.45 0 0
binding ICs 12, 21, 31, 32, 43
 = 1:2 1 0.81 1.38 0.52 0.65 1.21 0.81 -0.83 0.16
2 0.81 1.38 0.52 0.65 1.21 0.81 -0.17 0.10
3 1.45 5.87 1.85 1.85 0.88 0.69 -0.64 -0.21
4 1.42 6.06 1.56 1.56 1.28 1.24 0 0
binding ICs 12, 21, 31, 32, 43
i. Compared to the laissez-faire solution all individuals save less, but demand more
private LTC insurance. Only type-4 agents remain fully insured. Due to their high
degree of ignorance concerning the possibility of dependence, type-3 agents are less
than perfectly insured.17 Type-l individuals are even overinsured, that is if disabled
they have a higher consumption than if they stay healthy in old age. This result can
be explained by inspecting the binding incentive constraints (ICs). These are mainly
from type-h to type-l individuals. Inducing type-l individuals to demand more LTC
insurance reduces the incentives of type-h individuals to mimic as they have to pay a
higher price for LTC insurance.
17 In other words, their LTC insurance coverage given by i=('j) = 0:90=(1  1  0:4) = 2:25 is
smaller than L = 3 which implies lower consumption is the state of disability.
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Now assume l = 0:6 so that myopic agents are less ignorant concerning their pos-
sible dependency. Compared to our benchmark scenario, type-l individuals now demand
less LTC insurance but self-insure more extensively via private savings. The opposite
is true for type-3 agents. Again, this can be explained by the binding ICs. As Table 3
shows type-4 individuals no longer have an incentive to mimic type-l individuals if these
are less ignorant concerning their LTC needs. Thus, inducing type-l agents to demand
more LTC insurance becomes a less e¢ cient policy.
If private LTC insurance comes with a positive loading factor even type-4 individuals
are no longer fully insured against the LTC risk. Specically, we observe the following
changes. The higher costs for LTC insurance reduce the individualsconsumption while
working and in the state of disability in old-age. Their labor supply increases to nance
the additional resources required for a possible frailty in old-age. Additionally, a lower
tax on private savings enhances the attractiveness for all agents to self-insure via a
higher wealth accumulation.
Figures 3 (a)(g) illustrate how changes in the share of rational agents a¤ect the
optimal tax on LTC insurance and savings. In all scenarios the optimal tax on LTC
insurance is an increasing function of the share of rational agents. In our benchmark
case Figure 3 (a) myopic individualsLTC insurance is always subsidized. Whether
type-2 individuals are taxed or subsidized depends on the share of rational agents.
They are taxed for larger shares of rational agents to relax the incentive constraint from
type-4 to type-2 agents. A decreasing ignorance concerning LTC in old age reduces
the paternalistic objective and thus increases the tax on LTC insurance for all agents
(Figure 3 (b)). For a large share of rational agents, also type-3 agents may now face
a tax on their private LTC insurance premium. A positive loading factor (Figure 3
(c)) hardly changes the optimal tax on LTC insurance, but reduces the tax on private
savings in order to increase all agentsself-insurance (see Figure 3 (g)). As Figures 3
(b), (e) and (g) illustrate whether an individual faces a tax or subsidy on private savings
depends less on the degree of myopia but more on the income type. In all scenarios
type-l individuals face a tax on their savings in order to relax the incentive constraint
from type-h to type-l individuals. The optimal tax on type-3 agentssavings very much
resembles their tax on LTC insurance. Taking a closer look at the axis of ordinates
reveals that the magnitude of the tax on savings is much lower than on LTC insurance,
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Figure 3: Marginal tax/subsidy on LTC insurance and savings without public LTC.
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Table 4: With public LTC provision: l = h = 0:5
type ci yi si di i Di mi T i T
i
s
 = 1:05 1 0.85 1.33 0.50 0.63 0.93 0.52 0.92 -0.82 0.22
2 0.85 1.33 0.50 0.63 0.93 0.52 0.92 -0.11 0.12
3 1.47 5.73 1.70 1.70 0 2.31 1.00 -0.70 -0.14
4 1.46 5.82 1.46 1.46 0 3.00 1.46 -0.05 0
binding ICs 12, 21, 31, 32, 41, 42, 43
 = 1:2 1 0.78 1.36 0.57 0.71 0 3.00 0.71 -0.82 0.07
2 0.78 1.36 0.57 0.71 0 3.00 0.71 -0.11 0.07
3 1.49 5.64 1.64 1.64 0 2.57 1.21 0.78 -0.10
4 1.50 5.56 1.50 1.50 0 3.00 1.50 -0.17 0
binding ICs 12, 21, 31, 32, 41, 42, 43
that is compared to the tax on LTC insurance it only plays a minor role in the optimal
tax design.
7.2 With public LTC provision
Now assume the government has public long-term care as an additional instrument to
redistribute between individuals (i.e., we no longer impose Di = 0). As the binding
ICs are those from type-h to type-l agents for a given , the utilitarian solution implies
redistribution towards low income agents. We know from Section 6 that in this case
no public LTC provision is optimal unless  > 1. But, a LTC insurance premium that
exhibits a mark-up substantially above expected benets seems to the more realistic
scenario (see Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). Table 4 reports the optimal provision of
public LTC and each individuals consumption for loading factors equal to  = 1:05 and
 = 1:2.
When  = 1:05 type-h individuals receive solely public LTC. As they are not mim-
icked by other agents, the negative incentive e¤ects of public LTC care are nil and only
the positive e¢ ciency e¤ect prevails. Public provision of LTC to type-l individuals, by
contrast, comes along with a higher attractiveness to get mimicked by type-h agents.
That is, there is a trade-o¤ between the incentive and the e¢ ciency e¤ect implying
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Figure 4: Public LTC provision.
only a partial provision of public LTC to type-l individuals. Compared to the scen-
ario with no public LTC provision, type-l individuals are prepared worse for a possible
dependency during old-age while the opposite is true for type-h agents.
If the loading on private LTC insurance increases to  = 1:2, the negative incentive
e¤ects of public LTC are o¤set by its e¢ ciency gains. All individuals rely solely on
public LTC. For all individuals but type-3 agents the public system fully insures against
the risk of LTC implying D = L.
8 Conclusion
This paper has examined whether myopia (misperception of the LTC risk) and private
insurance market loading costs provide a possible rationale for social LTC insurance
and/or for the subsidization of private insurance. It has employed a model wherein
individuals di¤er in three unobservable characteristics: level of productivity, survival
probability and degree of ignorance concerning the risk of LTC (the former two being
perfectly positively correlated). It has shown that to decentralize a rst-best allocation,
LTC insurance premiums of the myopic agents can be subsidized (at a Pigouvianrate)
or alternatively we can have public provision of the appropriate level of LTC. Under full
information (and actuarially fair private insurance) these two instruments are perfectly
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equivalent, but we need at least one of them. When private insurance is subject to a
loading factor (rst-best) social LTC provision dominates.
The support for the considered LTC policy instruments has appeared to be more
mitigated in a second-best setting. When social LTC provision is restricted to zero,
a myopic agents tax on private LTC insurance premiums involves a tradeo¤ between
paternalistic and redistributive (incentive) considerations and we may have a tax as well
as a subsidy on private LTC insurance. Interestingly, savings (which goes untaxed in
the rst-best) is also subject to (positive or negative) taxation in the second-best and
the expression for the tax rates includes also a Pigouvian and a redistributive term.
Social LTC provision is never second-best optimal when private insurance markets are
fair (irrespective of the degree of the proportion of myopic individuals and their degree
of misperception). At the other extreme, when the loading factor in the private sector
is su¢ ciently high, private coverage is completely crowded out by public provision. For
intermediate levels of the loading factors, the solution relies on both types of insurance.
To sum up, myopia (irrespective of its extent) is not per se su¢ cient to justify public
LTC provision. Furthermore, misperceptions must be su¢ ciently severe or widespread
to obtain a subsidy on private insurance. Otherwise, the incentive term may well dom-
inate the Pigouvian term so that even myopic individuals may face a (marginal) tax on
private LTC insurance.
The main results were obtained for a rather general setting with an arbitrary (but
nite) number of types. In particular, our expressions are valid whatever the pattern of
binding incentive constraints (which is impossible to assess at this level of generality).
For the interpretation we have argued that under reasonableassumptions one can ex-
pect the incentive term to favor a tax (rather than a subsidy) on private LTC insurance.
To shed more light on this issue we have taken di¤erent avenues. First, we presented
the analytical solution for some special cases. Second, we have presented a number of
numerical examples for a four type setting. These additional investigations show that
the assumptions we make in the general section are not empty (or mutually inconsist-
ent). They also conrm that the expression for the optimal tax on LTC insurance do
not just appear to be ambiguous but that one can e¤ectively have positive and negative
taxes as well as corner and interior solutions for social and private LTC insurance.
All this being said, our representation of the private LTC insurance market is ad-
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mittedly highly stylized. Imperfections, if any, are reected solely by the loading factor
which is a black boxthat includes factors as diverse as administrative cost and inform-
ational problems. A more ambitious approach would rely on an explicit modelling of
the private market information imperfection and specically the ramications brought
about by individualsmisperception of their risk, following the recent work by Sandroni
and Squintani (2007) and Spinnewijn (2012). This extension is left for future research.
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